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Abstract: If, as Hume argues, property is a self-referring custom of a group of people, then 
property rights depend on how that group forms and orders itself.  In this paper we investigate 
how people construct a convention for property in an experiment in which groups of self-selected 
individuals can migrate between three geographically separate regions. We find that the absence 
of property rights clearly decreases wealth in our environment and that interest in establishing 
property rights is a key determinant of the decision to migrate to a new region. Theft is nearly 
eliminated among migrants, resulting in strong growth, and non-migrants remain in poverty. 
Thus, self-selection, through the decision to migrate, to form more cooperative groups is 
essential for establishing property rights.  
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The conception of property certainly did not fall ready made from heaven. 
-- F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, Volume 1: Rules and Order 
 
1  Introduction 
Property rights are essential for economic development. Yet the economic and institutional 
foundations of ownership and transfer are not well understood. According to David Hume, the 
development of conventions of justice produced the institution of property, which denominates 
three fundamental laws of human nature: the stability of possession, transference by consent, and 
the performance of promises. Furthermore, these laws portend that “[w]here possession has no 
stability, there must be perpetual war. Where property is not transferred by consent, there can be 
no commerce. Where promises are not observed, there can be no leagues or alliances” (1740, p. 
363). Hence the wealth of nations is built upon such agreements, but we know surprisingly little 
about why rights to property exist and the process by which they are formed.  
The focus of previous research has been on the central role of property rights in dispute 
resolution (Coase, 1960; Ellickson, 1991), how changes in incentives alter the form of property 
rights (Demsetz, 1967; Cheung 1970), the variety of existing property rights institutions 
(Ostrom, 1990), and, in turn, the long-run path of economic growth (North, 1981). Recent 
empirical studies emphasize the connection between property rights and growth (Acemoglu and 
Johnson, 2005; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2003), urban land values (Collins and Margo, 2007; 
Lanjouw and Levy, 2002), labor supply (Field, 2007), and agricultural investment (Alston, 
Libecap, and Schneider, 1996; Brasselle, Gaspart, and Platteau, 2002; Hornbeck, 2010), in 
particular settings. 
These studies are important contributions to understanding the function of property rights 
and evaluating the consequences of their absence for economic development. Taking a different 
approach, this paper uses a laboratory experiment to document the discovery process that creates 
and sustains the institution of property in the replicated setting in a laboratory. Subjects in our 
experiment are placed in a world with repeat interaction, gains from exchange, and a relatively 
open action space. This environment allows subjects to engage in a trial-and-error discovery 
process and gives them the opportunity to form groups to overcome the poverty of an initial “no 
property rights” condition.1 
                                                
1The phrase “no property rights” is not equivalent to “no notion of property rights” among our subjects. Instead, we 
transplant our subjects from a world with property rights into an experimental world where they must rediscover the 
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In addition, theft is possible and group formation is endogenous through the decision to 
move between three geographically separate regions. In two treatments we vary the potential 
returns to migration. In one treatment, production possibilities are doubled if at least four of the 
eight subjects undertake the cost of migrating to a new region. In the second treatment, there is 
no super-additive productivity when individuals migrate to that same region. Hence, by 
comparing behavior in these two treatments we can distinguish the emergence of property due to 
increased productivity and predation from the case where property rights emerge in response to 
predation alone.  
The results suggest that self-selection, through the decision to migrate, is essential for 
realizing the gains from trade. This is important and remarkable in light of the recent literature 
reviewed in Section 2. Our other findings are (1) the importance of property rights for wealth 
creation in our environment, (2) the absence of theft among migrants, which suggests a 
successful mechanism for identifying latent cooperation, and (3) declining theft among non-
migrants, which suggests the potential for reform within initially uncooperative groups.  
 
2  Previous Work 
2.1  Specialization and Exchange 
This paper builds on a recent laboratory study by Crockett, Smith, and Wilson (2009; hereafter 
CSW), in which the subjects in a two-good exchange economy must discover their comparative 
advantage and develop some system of exchange to support wealth creation. CSW define a weak 
institutional environment and then explore the conditions of that environment, such as 
information about the production technology or group size, that enhance or stifle wealth creation.   
In other laboratory studies, Kimbrough, Smith, and Wilson explore different aspects of 
the effect of property rights on the expansion of specialization and exchange. First, by inducing 
two “histories”, one with experimenter enforced property rights and another with no exogenous 
property rights enforcement, Kimbrough, Smith, and Wilson (2008; hereafter KSWa), find that 
economies with a history of property rights are substantially more specialized, wealthier, and 
more equitable, than economies without this history. However, KSWa treat property rights as 
                                                                                                                                                       
“rules of the game” and reapply them within their own subject groups. As Crockett, Smith, and Wilson (2009) put it, 
“we are relying on them to draw upon their individual experiences, as they see fit, to activate their own implicit rules 
for the novel tasks that we give them. [Throughout] history, people had to learn ways of interfacing with each other 
in the context in which they lived and to create a social system from the inside based on natural language adapted to 
economic change.” 
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historically given or not and then explore differences between these two conditions. This 
approach powerfully demonstrates that groups with fixed size and a history of property rights can 
uniformly outperform economies without this history. But this raises the question of how a group 
might order itself to take advantage of specialization and exchange.  
  In this vein, Kimbrough, Smith, and Wilson (2010; hereafter KSWb) design a laboratory 
experiment to explore the formation of property rights among subjects in a similar environment 
with near costless theft. In half of their baseline sessions, subjects establish stable possession and 
transference by consent to exploit the gains of specialization and exchange. The efficiency of 
these sessions rivals the wealthiest economies in which theft is exogenously impossible. In 
marked contrast, in the other half of the sessions possession is not stable and the economies are 
woefully inefficient (one is over 20% less efficient than autarky). KSWb then introduce three 
exogenous enforcement mechanisms as treatments to ascertain whether the bad apples can be 
brought into line. For example, in one treatment the subjects can, at a cost, block others from 
taking their goods. In only one out of six sessions is this effective. The remaining sessions, in 
contrast, tend to be less efficient than when this blocking mechanism is not present.  
All three KSWb mechanisms were constructed on the view that property rights are a 
procedure by which individuals adjust to exogenous shocks that affect the costs and benefits of 
internalization versus externalization. KSWb confess that in the design process they did not 
appreciate how much the success of their treatments would depend on how each mechanism 
would operate in conjunction with the particular dispositions and impulses of a fixed group of 
eight subjects. Unless the dispositions rendered the mechanisms unnecessary to begin with, or 
exactly matched the problematic temperaments that needed to be overcome in a particular 
economy, KSWb find that the mechanism treatments tend to worsen outcomes.  
So it is possible that property rights can fail to emerge, not because there is no latent 
desire for them among some members of the group, but rather due to the tenuousness of a 
convention that is based solely on the reciprocal behavior of all members of the group and that is 
not enforced by a third party.2  Migration in our experimental design allows latent cooperators to 
flee the plunderers and perpetual war to establish stable possession. As experimenters, we then 
                                                
2 Collins and Margo (2007) present evidence of this fragility in the modern American context. They find that 
property values fell more in cities that experienced severe riots in the 1960s. Moreover, the losses were localized 
around the most riot-effected areas within cities. Thus, setting aside the effect of legal regime, the value and security 
of property rights appear to derive from expectations about a particular group in a particular environment. 
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have the luxury of varying the potential returns to migration to distinguish between the effect of 
super-additive productivity and the operation of social convention on the emergence of property 
rights. 
 
2.2  Group Formation and Public Goods 
Many institutions that support exchange depend critically on the size and temperaments of the 
groups governed by the institution. If this is the case, then it is essential to understand the process 
by which a group forms and orders itself. Free-riding in the context of the provision of public 
goods has been the focus of many laboratory studies (e.g., Bochet, Page, and Putterman, 2005; 
Cinyabuguma, Page, and Putterman, 2005; Isaac and Walker, 1988). Most relevant for our 
results are the studies that have also focused on the effect of endogenous group formation.  
Erhart and Keser (1999) show that in a public goods game with migration, subjects 
willing to cooperate (i.e., contribute to the public good) form groups through migration and these 
cooperative groups are able to achieve higher contributions levels than noncooperative ones. 
More recent studies by Coricelli, Fehr, and Fellner (2004), Page, Putterman, and Unel (2005), 
Ones and Putterman (2007) Ahn, Isaac, and Salmon (2008), Charness and Yang (2008), and 
Kosfeld, Okada, and Reidl (2009) show these findings are robust to different institutions 
governing group formation, though the gains are modest and still subject to decay in repeated 
interactions.  
In our experiment, there are gains from trade, violations of property rights by theft, and, 
finally, migration to form new groups, all of which provide a check on predatory behavior. Thus, 
our experimental design allows us to explore how groups form to protect and respect property 
rights in an environment that is quite different from the commonly studied (voluntary 
contributions) public goods games. 
 
3  Experimental Design and Procedures 
3.1  Computer Interface 
Figure 1 displays the computer interface for our experiment. Each subject is endowed with a 
field and house (highlighted green) and controls a scroll wheel (in the top-center portion of the 
screen) used to allocate his endowment of time for production of two goods, red and blue. 
5 
Production is displayed in the field, and when the field is selected (highlighted in yellow), its 
contents, blue and red chit icons, appear in the top-left portion of the screen.  
A subject moves units by left-clicking to select them (which turns them yellow) and then 
right-clicking and dragging them to the desired destination with the right mouse button 
depressed. Notice, this allows for “theft” since subjects can move units from another subject’s 
house or field into their own house or field.  Only units in a subject’s own house at the end of 
each period generate earnings; units not consumed do no carry over to subsequent periods and 
are wasted.   
The information in the top-right portion of the screen summarizes how earnings are 
calculated, the total profit excluding the current period, the time remaining in the current period, 
and the current period and phase. In addition, the chat room in the center of the screen allows 
subjects to send messages to each other, and there is a space below each house to display one-
line message that is visible to all subjects. Thus, the consumption of red and blue units is a 
function of production, chat room messages, and units moved.  Finally, the movement of all 
goods between people is recorded in the chat room, including the quantity and the subjects 
involved.   
 
3.2  Environment 
Each experimental session consists of 8 subjects of two types: odd and even. Each type is 
endowed with technologies for producing red and blue. In each period, subjects are endowed 
with T = 10 seconds and choose t seconds to allocate to the production of red and (10 – t) 
seconds to allocate to the production of blue.  Odd types produce according to the following 
functions: 
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And even types produce according to these functions: 
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If an agent allocates the entire endowment T to red (blue), then odd types produce 130 (23) units 
and even types produce 25 (110) units. Thus, odd types have an absolute advantage in producing 
red and even types in blue. 
Finally, each type derives utility from consuming r red and b blue units in strict 
complements, subject to integer constraints, according to the following preferences by agent 
type: }3,min{ brU
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=  and 
! 
U
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Thus, odd subjects earn 3 cents for each 
combination of 3 red and 1 blue consumed and even subjects earn 2 cents for each combination 
of 1 red and 2 blue consumed.  
  
3.3  Institution 
Each session lasts 48 periods, each with two phases: (A) production and (B) exchange and 
consumption. Before the start of the 10-second production phase, each subject chooses the 
number of red and blue units to produce by setting t, and by the end of the phase all of the units 
are produced.  In the 120-second exchange and consumption phase, agents can send messages 
through the chat room and move goods to and from each other. The number of red and blue units 
in an agent’s house at the end of exchange and consumption phase determines a subject’s 
earnings for that period. 
We refer to each block of 7 periods as a “week” (e.g. week 1 is the first seven periods, 
week 2 is the second seven periods, etc.) and every 7th period as a “break period” in which there 
is no production.3  We follow CSW’s Build8 treatment and increase group size gradually over 
the first five weeks; increases always result in a balanced number of odd and even subjects in 
each group. In weeks 1-3, each session consists of four 2-subject groups. In week 4, each session 
consists of two 4-subject groups. After the final increase in week 5, each session consists of one 
8-subject group. 
This gradual increase in group size is entirely experimenter controlled. However, starting 
in week 5, subjects also have access to travel that allows them to migrate between three 
geographically separated regions: East, Middle, and West. The region layout is such that subjects 
                                                
3 CSW report in a footnote that they conducted pilot sessions with unpaid participants and without any rest periods 
and observed that the participants “could use an intermittent break to relax and reflect upon their experience” (p. 
1170). 
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must always move to the Middle to travel between East and West. Migration allows subjects to 
change group size endogenously, outside of experimenter control. 
The characteristics of each region are displayed in the top-left corner of the screen 
starting in week 5. In the East and West there is no experimenter/software enforcement of 
personal property rights. Our treatments vary the production capabilities of subjects in the West 
(see below) and, in the Middle, subjects are limited to autarky production but property rights are 
enforced exogenously.  
When travel is introduced in week 5 (period 28), an instruction box appears describing 
the newly visible View and Travel buttons. View allows subjects to see the characteristics of 
other regions without traveling, and Travel allows subjects to transport their house and field to a 
new region. The cost of moving is that a subject produces zero units in the first period in a new 
region; production resumes the following period. Thus, to make it to the West, a subject foregoes 
two full periods of production and consumption (unless one of those periods is a rest period).4 
 
3.4  Competitive Equilibrium 
The autarky and competitive equilibrium of these economies follows directly from the 
preferences and production functions. In autarky, odd subjects earn 30 cents and even subjects 
earn 26 cents per period. In the competitive equilibrium consisting of a single odd and even, the 
subject-pair fully specializes in their absolute advantaged good, exchange at the competitive 
price (40 red for 30 blue), and earn 90 and 80 cents per period, respectively. However, the trade 
equilibrium described above does not hold where the number of odd and even subjects is not 
equal, due to the introduction of travel, in which case we employ a benchmark of a bilateral 
trading rule that minimizes waste.  Starr (1976) describes a bilateral procedure in which agents 
exchange repeatedly until the smaller of excess supply or excess demand is exhausted. We use 
this trading rule since it fits the observed (bilateral) behavior in CSW, and furthermore 
Kimbrough (2010) demonstrates that simulated agents using this trading rule are 
indistinguishable from human-subject behavior in experiments with perfectly enforced property 
rights.   
                                                
4 In practice, few people in the East strategically move to avoid losing a day of production because the opportunity 
cost is losing that same production to theft. 
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First, from their production, agents consume to maximize their autarky utility. The 
remaining (marginal) red and blue units are then available for trade. Second, agents identify a 
trading partner, the marginal units available for trade are summed across the two agents, and an 
optimization routine is applied. Optimization yields an integer solution that allocates units 
according to agent preferences and minimizes waste. The optimization yields a quantity we refer 
to as “potential profit.” 
Note that the optimization yields allocations that are Pareto improvements from autarky 
given current period production for each subject in the group. Since the allocations implied by 
the trading rule are Pareto, it is possible for potential profit to be less than actual profit since it is 
not all but only marginal units that are used to calculate potential profit.  
 
3.5  Treatment 
In the first four weeks all sessions are identical. All subjects reside in the East as the group size 
increases from two to four in week 4 (period 21) and from four to eight in week 5 (period 28.) In 
period 28, we then introduce the ability to travel and the treatment conditions. We refer to the 
first treatment as Double (session 1-6) and the second as Single (session 7-12). 
In Double, subjects produce twice as much in the West as in the East, provided there are 
at least four subjects in West. This does not necessarily increase earnings, but an odd-even 
subject-pair completely specialized in their absolute advantages and trading at the competitive 
price earns 180 and 160 cents, respectively, as opposed to 90 and 80 cents in East. Single 
provides the same opportunity for travel, but subjects produce according to the same production 
function as in East. 
 
3.6  Property Rights and Theft 
Following KSWb, we distinguish theft from other types of movement: exchange, gift, and steal 
trade (mutual taking with consent which is equivalent to exchange).5 We define theft as the 
                                                
5 Smith (1982) defines property rights through the institution: rules by which “agents may communicate and 
exchange or transform commodities for the purpose of modifying initial endowments in accordance with private 
tastes and knowledge” (pp. 924-25). In our experiment, the institution does not enforce property rights in exchange: 
a subject can remove units from the house or field of another subject. Thus, the presence of theft signals that 
subjects do not have the exclusive right to exchange commodities in line with their own (private) tastes and 
knowledge. 
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unidirectional movement by Person i from Person j to i’s house or field, i ≠ j, without j’s consent, 
and calculated the amount of theft (as opposed to steal trading) using the following procedure: 
1. Identify each action in which i removed units from j’s house or field. 
2. Determine i’s relationship with j through chat room transcripts. 
3. Record as steal trade actions by i to which j consented and record remaining actions by i 
as theft. 
Once i and j have established a cooperative relationship, the relationship is terminated if i or j 
take an action to which the other objects in the chat room.6 
 
3.7  Procedures 
We recruited 96 subjects from the undergraduate population at a large state university and 
conducted 6 sessions for each treatment. Subjects, with one exception, had no experience in a 
similar experiment.7 Upon arriving in the laboratory subjects were seated at visually isolated 
computer terminals and read self-paced instructions on their computer screen. Each subject was 
paid $7 for showing up on time, plus what they earned based on decisions in the experiment. 
Each session lasted approximately 110 minutes after which subjects were paid their full earnings 
in private. Excluding the show-up payment, mean earnings for the twelve sessions were $13.65, 
with a low of $2.47 and a high of $31.96. 
 
4  Hypotheses 
Before period 28 we expect no differences between the Double and Single treatments. Our main 
predictions concern the differences in our sessions after travel is introduced in period 28. 
However, we use the data before period 28 to examine the impact of theft on profit and 
hypothesize that theft will reduce profit. It may seem unnecessary to include this hypothesis, but 
if data do not bear it out, it becomes difficult to interpret the data after travel becomes possible.  
Our experimental design and previous experimental studies suggest further hypotheses 
regarding cooperation and the emergence of property rights after the introduction of travel.  After 
period 28, the difference in the return to travel between treatments suggests that we should 
                                                
6 Subjects are not the least bit shy to express their objection and disapproval to the movement of items from their 
house or field that they did not consent to. 
7 Due to a recruiting error, Person 2 in session 4 participated in a similar experiment. The chat room transcripts 
reveal that this person did not noticeably improve the performance of another participant by disseminating prior 
knowledge of design similarities. 
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observe more subjects moving to West in Double than in Single. A related hypothesis, suggested 
by Demsetz (1967), is that “property rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains of 
internalization become larger then the cost of internalization” (p. 350). In other words, 
institutions to enforce property rights emerge where their benefits, protection from theft, are 
greater than their costs, monitoring to enforce cooperation. In our experimental design, subjects 
in Single would only travel when the costs of remaining in the East were high relative to the 
benefits. Subjects in Single are responding to the high costs of cooperation in the East by 
traveling to the West, where the potential benefits are no greater but costs, in their estimation, 
will be lower. Thus, we hypothesize that theft in the West will be lower in Single than in Double. 
The final hypothesis suggests a relationship between migrants (to the West) and non-
migrants. Since travel is costly and there is no guarantee that all decisions to migrate will result 
in higher profit (e.g., because at least three subjects do not follow in Double or no subjects 
follow in Single), we expect that only subjects willing to cooperate will incur the cost of 
traveling West. Thus, we hypothesize less theft and more profit for subjects who travel to the 
West. We will find evidence for or against this hypothesis in the comparison of actual and 
potential profit, the level of theft in the West versus the East, as well as individual characteristics 
of migrants and non-migrants. 
Our hypotheses can be summarized as follows: 
Hypothesis 1 (Theft) Prior to the introduction of travel, more theft reduces profit. 
Hypothesis 2 (Demsetz) In the Single treatment, there is less theft in the West than in the Double 
treatment. 
Hypothesis 3 (Selection) There is less theft among migrants than among non-migrants and 
profits are higher for migrants than for non-migrants. 
In the next section, we proceed by observing whether (1) property rights (agreements 
over the exchange of goods) are positively related to profit, (2) migration is determined, in part, 
by the potential for reaping gains from exchange, and (3) property rights are more prevalent in 
the West.  
 
5  Results 
All sessions are institutionally identical prior to the introduction of travel in week 5. Thus, we 
expect behavior across treatments to be similar. Table 1 reports mean specialization, efficiency, 
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and theft by treatment for weeks 1-4.  Specialization and efficiency are defined in Appendix A. 
The measure of theft is the quantity of red and blue units removed from a subject’s house or field 
without his consent averaged over each period and group.  Comparing the entries in each week 
there does not appear to be a substantial difference by treatment. Indeed, two-sided Wilcoxon 
rank sum tests on the means of each variable for pairs and groups of four fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of equal means across the Double and Single treatments.8 
The first two columns of Table 2 report profit (earnings) in each of weeks 1-4 for CSW’s 
Build8 treatment and the potential profit implied by applying the trading rule described in 
Section 3.4. In weeks 1-4, the only difference between the Build8 sessions and our experimental 
sessions is that we do not enforce property rights. The similarity in the means and standard 
deviations of these quantities for each week is striking and suggests that the trading rule 
approximates allocations that are achievable without theft.  This brings us to our first finding, a 
subsidiary result necessary for testing Hypothesis 1.  
 
Finding 1: The potential profit in our twelve sessions without property rights is 
indistinguishable from actual profit in CSW’s Build8 treatment with property rights. 
 
The results of two-sided Wilcoxon rank sum tests comparing potential profit in our sessions to 
actual profit in CSW for week 1 (W48,40 = 625.5, p-value = 0.0050, two-sided), week 2 (W48,40 = 
880.0, p-value = 0.5040, two-sided), week 3 (W48,40 = 860.5, p-value = 0.4060, two-sided), and 
week 4 (W24,20 = 274.0, p-value = 0.4296, two-sided), can only reject the null hypothesis of equal 
means in week 1. Thus, our measure of potential profit does well in approximating outcomes that 
are attainable through voluntary exchange. 
In the remainder of this section we test our main hypotheses and indicate interesting 
regularities in the data. To preview, we find strong support for each of Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. In 
                                                
8 The results of the Wilcoxon rank sum tests for specialization for week 1 (W24,24 = 240.5, p-value = 0.3324, two-
sided), week 2 (W24,24 = 227.5, p-value = 0.2159, two-sided), week 3 (W24,24 = 282.5, p-value = 0.9179, two-sided), 
and week 4 (W12,12 = 63, p-value = 0.6233, two-sided), cannot reject the null hypothesis for equal means across the 
Double and Single treatments. Similarly, the results for efficiency for week 1 (W24,24 = 334.5, p-value = 0.3428, two-
sided), week 2 (W24,24 = 297.5, p-value = 0.8609, two-sided), week 3 (W24,24 = 239.5, p-value = 0.3173, two-sided), 
and week 4 (W12,12 = 239, p-value = 0.2986, two-sided), cannot reject the null hypothesis for equal means across 
Double and Single. Finally, the results for theft for week 1 (W24,24 = 275, p-value = 0.7966, two-sided), week 2 
(W24,24 = 280, p-value = 0.8768, two-sided), week 3 (W24,24 = 311, p-value = 0.6351, two-sided), and week 4 (W12,12 
= 81, p-value = 0.6209, two-sided), cannot reject the null hypothesis for equal means across Double and Single. 
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addition, we find that not only is actual profit (earnings) in the West robustly increasing over the 
course of the experiment, unsurprising given the potential boost to production in Double, but also 
that the percent of potential profit realized is high. 
 
5.1  The Impact of Theft on Profit 
Figure 2 plots theft per person in each week: in pairs in weeks 1-3, in groups of four in week 4, 
and in the East and West in weeks 5-7. In the first four weeks, theft increases gradually from a 
low of 24 units to a maximum of 109 units per person. In the last three weeks, theft spikes 
initially in the East, reaching a high of more than 200 units in week 5. Theft subsequently 
decreases in the East but is never as low as in the West. Figure 2 clearly illustrates the prevalence 
of theft throughout the experiment and hints that migration may be instrumental in its reduction.  
However, we must first discover whether theft is something worth reducing. Is there a 
significant, negative relationship between profit and theft? To answer this question, we estimate 
the equation (1) for 48 pairs in weeks 1-3 and 24 groups of four in week 4.9 Then later 
investigate whether endogenous group formation through migration is effective in reducing theft 
in weeks 5-7. The results are reported in the first two columns of Table 3. 
 
  
! 
(1)     Profitgp ="0 +"1Periodgp +"2Specializationgp +"3Wordsgp +"4Theftgp +"5Theftgp
2
+#g + $gp
 
Profit is the natural log of profit per person (plus one) in each group g of two or four subjects in 
period p; Period is an integer counter for each period (omitting the break period); Specialization 
is the mean rate of specialization; and Words is the mean number of space-delimited strings of 
characters typed by the subjects.10 Theft is the total number of units moved from a person’s 
house or field without his consent and Theft2 is its square.11 Finally,
! 
" ),0(~ 21!N is a random 
effect for each group g. 
In pairs and groups of four, an additional unit of theft reduces profit by 0.13 percent. The 
mean (standard deviation) quantity of theft per period is 66 (167) units in pairs and 77 (131) 
units in groups of four. Thus, a one standard deviation increase from the mean quantity of theft 
                                                
9 Importantly, since all of the independent variables in equation (1) are set before the determination of profit, these 
variables are exogenous to the dependent variable. 
10 We include Words as a measure of sociality; we expect that the more subjects converse with each other, the more 
cooperation they are able to achieve by increasing specialization and exchange and decreasing plunder. 
11 The prevalence of large quantities of theft led us to control for this effect by including Theft2. 
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reduces profit 22 percent in pairs and 18 percent in groups of four. This effect is diminished by 
the positive coefficient on Theft2, however, it is economically small in pairs and statistically 
insignificant in groups of four. This is evidence for Hypothesis 1, but only measures the effect of 
theft on deviations from mean profit. How much money is left on the table as a result of theft?  
Visual inspection of the data reveals that a considerable portion of potential profit is 
indeed left on the table. Figure 3 plots the difference between potential and actual profit in the 
first four weeks. Both potential and actual profit appear to steadily increase. However, subjects 
appear no better at realizing the full amount of potential profit in week 4 than in week 1. 
To formally assess the contribution of theft to the difference between actual and potential 
profit we estimate equation (2). The results are reported in the last two columns of Table 3.  
 
  
! 
(2)     Profitgp - Profitgp ="0 +"1Periodgp +"2Specializationgp +"3Wordsgp +"4Theftgp
                                             +"5Theftgp
2
+#g + $gp
 
  
! 
Profit  is the natural log of potential profit per person (plus one); the other variables are defined 
as in equation (1). The results are reported in the second two columns of Table 3. 
In pairs, an additional unit of theft increases the ratio of potential to actual profit by 0.17 
percent. A one standard deviation increase from the mean quantity of theft increases the gap 
roughly 30 percent in pairs. This effect is statistically significant at the 1% level and 
economically large. The positive coefficient on Theft2 only slightly diminishes this effect. 
Finally, although the coefficient on Theft for groups of four in column 4 is statistically 
insignificant, the positive sign does cut in our favor.  The results of estimating equations (1) and 
(2) lead to our second finding, which supports Hypothesis 1. 
 
Finding 2: Theft decreases profit and increases the ratio of potential to actual profit. This effect 
is significant in equation (1) for pairs and groups of four and equation (2) for pairs only.  
 
From Finding 2, we conclude that violations of property rights do indeed have a dramatic 
negative effect on wealth creation in our economies. By our quantitative definition of the 
movement of items, the establishment of property rights requires explicit agreements for moving 
or removing goods, and explicit agreements are only possible through chat room communication. 
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Only typed words can be the source of such agreements, thus the presence of chat room 
communication suggests cooperation and should increase profit.  
In Table 3, the coefficient on Words has the predicted sign: an additional word increases 
profit by 0.69 and 1.1 percent in pairs and groups of four, respectively, and decreases the ratio of 
potential to actual profit by 0.47 and 0.95 percent. Together with the results on the coefficient for 
Theft, this demonstrates that even within a relatively weak set of institutional rules, it is possible 
for our subjects to develop agreements over the transfer of goods with sufficient content to 
substantially increase profit. Moreover, the ability to communicate through the chat room has the 
opposite effect of theft, suggesting that communication allows subjects to generate agreements 
over property rights that work to increase profit. 
In the next section we analyze the decision to move West once travel is introduced in 
week 5. In particular, we are interested in whether characteristics in weeks 1-4, prior to the 
introduction of travel, predict the decision to move and remain in the West. 
 
5.2  The Decision To Migrate 
Figure 4 plots the change in the number of subjects in the West by treatment.  Unsurprisingly, the 
data indicate that assignment to the Double treatment is clear predictor of the decision to move 
west. More interesting, perhaps, are the individual characteristics of subjects that might predict 
the decision to move and remain in the West.12 To analyze this decision we estimate equation (3), 
in which subject characteristics in week 4 predict the decision to move, InWest, a binary variable 
that is 1 if the subject was in the West in period 48 (the end of the session) and 0 otherwise: 
 
issisisiss TheftWordstionSpecializaDouble !µ""""" ++++++= 444     )3( 43210isWest  
 
Double identifies the treatment for session s, Specialization4 is the mean rate of specialization, 
Theft4 is the mean amount of theft, and Words4 is the mean number of words, all for each 
subject i in week 4 before travel is possible. We also include a session random effect 
! 
µ 
),0(~ 21!N . Table 4 reports the results, including coefficients and marginal effects. 
                                                
12 Few subjects spend any substantial time in the Middle. 
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The last two columns of Table 4 report the marginal effects stratified by the treatment 
dummy variable. As expected, the strongest predictor of moving to the West is belonging to 
Double: a discrete change from 0 to 1 increases the probability of moving west by 48.7 
percentage points. In addition, the marginal effect of Theft4 among subjects in Double suggests 
that an additional unit stolen decreases the probability a subject will move west by 0.13 
percentage points. Thus, an additional 146 units of theft (one standard deviation of Theft4 in 
Double) decreases the probability a subject will move west by 19.0 percentage points. Words4 
also predicts travel among subjects in Double: an additional word increases the probability a 
subject will move west by 2.6 percentage points. More casually, in the chat room transcripts we 
frequently observe that “thieves” are rather silent relative to those preyed upon, who are often 
quite vocal in expressing their disapproval, if not condemnation. 
Summarizing, the effect of the Double treatment on the decision to move is substantial. In 
addition, in Double, theft and typed words are indicative of the characteristics possessed by 
migrants. However, similar results do not hold for Single. Analysis from the previous section 
suggested that stealing less and talking more were both characteristics of groups that seemed to 
have better success establishing property rights. Looking again at Figure 2, we see much less 
theft in the West than in the East in weeks 5-7. In the final two sections, we analyze the 
determinants of theft and profit, emphasizing the impact of the migration decision. 
 
5.3  The Impact of Travel on Theft 
After the introduction of travel, theft in the East spikes in week 5 and then gradually declines. 
However, even as more and more subjects enter the West, theft remains at relatively low levels. 
This evidence tentatively suggests that group formation through migration successfully separates 
property-respecting subjects from the thieves. This subsection establishes the quantitative 
significance of this effect and the next subsection considers the effect of migration on profit. 
To examine the impact of region choice on theft, we estimate equation (4): 
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where TheftPerSubject is the natural log of the quantity of theft of a subject (plus one) divided by 
the number of subjects in the same region as subject i in period p. Thus, independent variables 
measure the effect on the outcome variable per subject in the same region. 
The interpretation of Words, in equation (4) is ambiguous since it is determined 
contemporaneously with theft. However, our main independent variables of interest are 
determined before any theft occurs and are thus exogenous to the dependent variable. Double is a 
dummy variable that is 1 for subjects in the Double treatment and 0 for subjects in Single; Travel 
is a dummy variable that is 1 if the subject produces nothing due to travel in the previous period 
and 0 otherwise; Region is a set of dummies to indicate the location of subject i in period p. 
Equation (4) is estimated for individuals from period 30, the first period that subjects could 
reside in the West, until the end of the session, with random effects for each person i. The results 
are reported in Table 5. 
Holding other characteristics constant, subjects in the West steal 64.0 [= –100 × (e1.023 – 
1)] percent less than subjects in the East. This suggests that one reason subjects may prefer the 
West at all is the relative absence of theft in that region compared to the East. This confirms the 
importance of endogenous group formation: by allowing subjects to choose, through migration, a 
sub-group from among others randomly assigned to their session, subjects can avoid interacting 
with those who do not share the cooperative characteristics of westbound migrants.  
This is analogous to the previous findings that endogenous group formation increases 
contributions in public good games. However, migration allows our subjects to nearly eliminate 
theft and establish property rights and then to use these property rights to undergird a system of 
exchange that rapidly increases wealth. This is astonishing given the complexity of the 
specialization and exchange task and the utter poverty observed in KSWb. 
Equation (4) only captures the effect of region on the level of theft, undifferentiated by 
treatment. To examine treatment- and region-specific effects we estimate Equation (5). 
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The dependent variable is identical to the dependent variable in equation (4). The interaction 
variable Period*Double captures changes in theft over time due to the treatments, while 
Period*Region captures changes due to the location differences. Finally, Double*Region 
provides a test of our Hypothesis 3: do subjects in the West steal less in Single than in Double? 
In Table 5, with the addition of the interaction terms the coefficient on West captures the 
effect of the West region for subjects in the Single treatment, while the sum of the coefficients on 
West and Double *West captures the effect for subjects in Double. Subjects in the West steal 94.4 
[= –100 × (e-2.875 – 1)] and 86.0 [= –100 × (e-2.875 + 0.912 – 1)] percent less than subjects in the East 
in Single and Double, respectively. This shows a strong negative effect of relocating to the West 
on the quantity of theft for both treatments, but the effect for Single is larger (more negative), as 
predicted. This provides evidence for our third and fourth findings, which support Hypothesis 2 
and Hypothesis 3, respectively. 
 
Finding 3: Theft is lower in the West in Single than in Double.  
 
Finding 4: Theft is significantly lower among subjects in the West than among their counterparts 
in the East.  
 
We do not want emphasize too strongly the difference between 94.4 and 86.0 percent and 
overstate the case for Hypothesis 2. More interesting, perhaps, is that the difference between the 
East and West, whether subjects were assigned to Double or Single, was so dramatic. Subjects 
moving to the West reduced and nearly eliminated theft, whereas significant levels of theft in the 
East remain. The final question is whether this reduction in theft is beneficial, i.e., does the 
establishment of property rights in the West increase profit? 
 
5.4  The Impact of Travel on Profit 
The previous findings for theft provide partial support for Hypothesis 3: theft is clearly lower 
among migrants than among non-migrants. Figures 5 and 6 give initial support to the claim that 
through migration, subjects are able to establish property rights and increase earnings.13 The 
shaded portions in both figures represent the difference between potential and actual profit. The 
                                                
13 Series stratified by the Double and Single treatments are qualitatively similar. 
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difference in the two regions couldn’t be starker. First, subjects in the West realize profits at 
levels extremely close to the waste minimizing optimum; there is little waste because there is 
little theft. The gap, however, between potential and actual profit in the East is initially 
considerably larger. Interestingly, this gap is shrinking by the last week as theft in the East also 
begins to decline. Apparently after the plundered have left, the situation becomes dire enough 
that the plunderers themselves begin to reform.  
Second and more noticeable, wealth in the West grows briskly. Having migrated to 
establish property rights, Westerners take more and more advantage of exchange and 
specialization, and in the Double treatment, also experience a two-fold increase in production 
when there are four settlers. Importantly, growth in the West occurs in both Double and Single, in 
fact, migrants in session 9 are the only migrants to find and maintain the competitive 
equilibrium, earning the maximum amount possible per period. In the East potential profit falls 
slightly because the more specialized (and hence productive) subjects have left. The Easterners 
may be stealing less by the end, but they are not exchanging and specializing more. This 
hysteresis is reminiscent of what KSWa find in their history of no property rights treatment.  
With an exogenous history of no property rights, KSWa observe that there is one village in each 
session which wallows in self-sufficiency even though the software perfectly enforces property 
rights. 
 To quantify this effect of location on profit and check that the doubled production 
possibilities alone are not driving the result we estimate equation (6) with the same independent 
variables as in equation (5) and over the same portion of the experiment. The results are reported 
in Table 6.14 
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Profit is natural log of profit (plus one) earned by subject i in period p.  
From Table 6, holding other characteristics constant, subjects in the West in either 
treatment earn roughly 240 [= 100 × (e1.243 – 1)] percent more than subjects in the East. Note that 
the coefficient on Double*West is insignificant, which suggests that the gains experienced by 
                                                
14 We also estimate a similar equation that excludes the interaction variables. The results are reported in Table 6. 
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westerners are not driven entirely by the super-additive production enjoyed by subjects in 
Double. The insignificant coefficient on Period*West indicates that this level difference between 
the East and the West is not eroding over time.  Hence, we find quantitative support for the profit 
portion of Hypothesis 3: 
 
Finding 5: Profit is significantly higher among subjects in the West than among their 
counterparts in the East. 
 
6  Conclusion 
In 1766 the English jurist and professor Sir William Blackstone famously wrote in his 
Commentaries on the Law of England:  
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of mankind as the 
right of property; or that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises to the external 
things of the world, in the total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe. And yet there 
are very few, that will give themselves the trouble to consider the origin and foundation of this right.  
Pleased as we may be with the possession, we seem to be afraid to look back to the means by which it was 
acquired, as if fearful of some defects in our title; or at best we rest satisfied with the decision of the laws in 
our favor, without examining the reason or authority upon which those laws have been built. (Book II, Ch. 
1, p. 2) 
 
This paper is an attempt to uncover the foundations upon which the law of property has 
been built. We report a laboratory experiment designed to explore how property rights emerge as 
a convention when people can self-select to form their own communities through geographic 
migration. When given the opportunity, we find that socially-minded individuals leave areas in 
which the stability of possession, Hume’s first fundamental law of human nature, is neither 
recognized nor respected. Upon resettlement, there is little theft and these migrants become 
much wealthier than their counterparts as they quickly adhere to Hume’s second fundamental 
law of nature, the transference of property by consent. Surprisingly, we also observe that the 
plunderers, when left with each other, also begin to establish more stable possession amongst 
themselves. They, however, engage in little specialization and exchange, and hence remain rather 
poor. Finally, we find evidence that migrants are sensitive to the difference in benefits from 
traveling to the West—subjects in Double travel earlier and in greater numbers than subjects in 
Single—but also to the difference in costs—subjects in Single steal less than subjects in Double.   
In conclusion, we observe the first replicable means by which subjects in the laboratory 
build a system of the property rights: Latent cooperators form communities of like-minded 
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individuals by putting physical and social distance between them and the uncooperative 
plunderers.15  Given the paucity with which property emerges in the laboratory when people 
cannot self-select and migrate,16 this is no small feat. This experiment powerfully supports what 
Samuel Pufendorf discussed in 1672, namely we “too discover the Falsity of that vulgar Saying, 
Mine and Thine are the cause of all Wars and Quarrels in the World.  For on the contrary the 
Distinction of Mine and Thine was rather introduc’d to prevent all Contention” (Book IV, Ch. 4, 
Section 7). And it is this necessary distinction that undergirds a fundamental insight of 
economics, viz., exchange and specialization create the wealth of nations. 
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Appendix 
A . Specialization and Efficiency 
We define specialization in our economies as 
! 
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$100 %, where 
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qip  denotes the total units 
of red and blue produced by subject i in period p of session S and 
! 
q ip  denotes the maximum 
production of red and blue units by i in p. 
 We define efficiency in our economies as 
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realized earnings of subject i in period p of session S, and 
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 are autarky and competitive 
earnings, respectively. Autarky earnings are subtracted from realized and competitive earnings to 
normalize autarky efficiency to zero. 
 
B.  Experiment Instructions 
Page 1 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. The instructions are simple, and if 
you follow them carefully and make good decisions you may earn a considerable amount of 
money which will be paid to you in CASH at the end of the experiment. 
 
In this experiment you are Person 3.  You and the other 7 people in this experiment each have 
the ability to produce two fictitious items: red and blue.  For the first 10 seconds of each period, 
you will produce items in your green field.  Using the scroll bar in the upper middle portion of 
your screen, you can change the proportion of each second allocated to producing red and blue.  
Each person’s production is displayed on their field.  When a field or house is selected it contents 
is represented by the domino-shapes in the top left portion of your screen.  To select a field or 
house left click on it, the house or field that is currently selected will be highlighted in yellow. 
 
Page 2 
After the production phase ends, the period continues for another 90 seconds.  When the clock 
expires, you earn cash based upon the number of red and blue items that have been moved to 
your house.  To select items to be moved, left click on the dominos or click on the red or blue 
select all buttons at the top of the screen.  The yellow highlighted items can be moved by 
dragging with the right mouse button.  The maximum number of red or blue items a house or 
field can hold is 170. (You cannot move items until the experiment has started or during the 
production phase.) 
 
The specific information on how the red and blue items in your house generate earnings is given 
in the upper right corner of your screen.  You personally earn (in cents) the minimum of the 
following two numbers: 
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 3 time number of red items, 
 number of blue items.   
 
Or, think of it this way.  You earn by consuming what’s in your house in the proportion of 3 red 
to 1 blue items.  For every 1 unit of blue you need 3 red to earn 3 cents. Your potential profit 
updates as items, unit by unit, are moved into your house. 
 
Page 3 
Everyone in this experiment can send text messages. Everyone can read all posted messages.  In 
the center of the screen, you can type a message in the text box next to the send button.  To send 
a text message press the Send button.  There are two chat rooms.  Messages sent to Chat Room 
A will only appear in chat room A.  Message sent to Chat Room B will only appear in chat room 
B 
 
Under your house you can also post a one-line message that will be visible at all times to the 
other players. 
 
You are free to discuss all aspects of the experiment, with the following exceptions: you may not 
reveal your name, discuss side payments, make threats, or engage in inappropriate language 
(including such shorthand as ‘WTF’).  If you do, you will be excused and you will forfeit your 
earnings. 
 
Page 4 
During the experiment, every 7 periods will be a “break period” in which nobody produces 
anything but that the chat rooms are still open. You can open a table of your production 
possibilities by clicking on the Show % s button. This table will fill in every time you change the 
proportion of time allocated using the scroll bar. 
 
This is the end of the instructions. If you wish to explore how you produce red and blue items, 
click the Practice button. You may change the proportion of time allocated to producing red and 
blue items using the scroll bar, and you may Practice as many times as you wish. (You will not 
be able to move items until the experiment has begun.)  
 
If you wish to review the instructions, you may go back at this time. If you feel you are prepared 
to proceed with the actual experiment, click on the Start button. The experiment will begin once 
everyone has clicked on the Start button.  If you have a question that you feel was not adequately 
answered by the instructions, please raise your hand and ask the monitor before proceeding.   
 
Specialization Efficiency Theft
Double Single Double Single Double Single
Week 1 36 ±4.8 39 ±4.9 -20 ±4.8 -19 ±7.2 345 ±374.9 373 ±327.9
Week 2 41 ±11.2 44 ±7.5 -11 ±12.0 -10 ±8.9 593 ±601.2 634 ±266.6
Week 3 49 ±11.6 53 ±15.6 0 ±14.8 15 ±23.2 723 ±1011.1 500 ±468.8
Week 4 55 ±14.7 62 ±24.5 9 ±16.8 25 ±37.4 719 ±617.2 520 ±537.0
Table 1: Specialization, efficiency, and theft by treatment. Standard deviations are reported in
smaller text following the ± sign.
Profit Rank Sum Test
Build8 Potential Profit W -statistic p-value
Week 1 22 ±6.5 26 ±8.6 625.5 0.0050
Week 2 31 ±15.0 30 ±12.6 880.0 0.5040
Week 3 37 ±19.8 40 ±24.2 860.5 0.4060
Week 4 42 ±16.4 38 ±21.7 274.0 0.4296
Table 2: Comparison with Crocket, Smith, and Wilson (2009). Standard deviations are reported
in smaller text following the ± sign. In weeks 1-3, the Wilcoxon rank sum tests are based on 48
independent pairs in from our data and 40 independent pairs from CSW. In week 4, the test is
based on 24 and 20 independent groups of four, respectively.
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Dependent Variable Profit Profit− Profit
Group Size (1) Two (2) Four (3) Two (4) Four
Constant 1.7305 1.6634 0.7043 1.6765
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Period 0.0233 0.0345 -0.0222 -0.0103
(0.000) (0.044) (0.000) (0.566)
Specialization 0.0209 0.0179 -0.0014 -0.0103
(0.000) (0.000) (0.425) (0.000)
Words 0.0069 0.0107 -0.0046 -0.0094
(0.064) (0.034) (0.186) (0.113)
Theft -0.0013 -0.0013 0.0017 .0010
(0.003) (0.053) (0.000) (0.279)
Theft2 ÷ 10000 0.0074 0.0152 -0.0067 -0.0113
(0.045) (0.122) (0.056) (0.373)
Observations 864 144 864 144
Table 3: Linear mixed-effects regressions for Profit and Profit−Profit. The results of estimating
equation (1) in the first two columns and equation (2) in the second two columns. p-values reported
in parentheses.
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Dependent Variable InWest
Coef. Mfx : Single Mfx : Double
Constant -2.7064
(0.015)
Double 2.4639 0.4867
(0.030) (0.056)
Specialization4 0.0088 0.00002 0.0005
(0.880) (0.890) (0.880)
Words4 0.0659 0.001214 0.0262
(0.096) (0.642) (0.096)
Theft4 -0.0034 -0.000063 -0.0014
(0.075) (0.668) (0.075)
Observations 96 6 23
Table 4: Probit analysis of decision to move West. The results of estimating equation (3). 6
subjects in Single and 23 subjects in Double moved to the West. p-values reported in parentheses.
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Dependent Variable TheftPerSubject Profit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 1.9397 2.5348 2.3175 2.4195
(0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.00)
Period -0.0306 -0.0712 0.0382 0.0576
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Specialization 0.0005 -0.0016 0.0062 0.0064
(0.595) (0.155) (0.000) (0.000)
Words -0.0177 -0.0168 -0.0036 -0.0038
(0.000) (0.000) (0.321) (0.299)
Double -0.6789 -1.2194 -0.2691 -0.5237
(0.460) (0.225) (0.704) (0.485)
Travel -0.2561 -0.2562 -2.1427 -2.1330
(0.073) (0.070) (0.000) (0.000)
Middle -1.4019 -2.1418 0.8526 1.3863
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
West -1.0225 -2.8747 1.2311 1.2430
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007)
Period ∗Double 0.0464 -0.0325
(0.000) (0.031)
Period ∗Middle 0.0686 -0.0038
(0.922) (0.089)
Period ∗West 0.0869 0.0265
(0.001) (0.331)
Double ∗Middle 0.0215 -0.6350
(0.003) (0.020)
Double ∗West 0.9120 -0.3580
(0.000) (0.293)
Observations 1632 1632 1632 1632
Table 5: Linear mixed-effects regressions for Theft and Profit. p-values reported in parentheses.
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Figure 1. Screenshot of Experimental Interface 
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Figure 2. Theft in Week 7 
In the first four weeks, theft is calculated by summing total quantity of theft in 
each period and dividing by 96, the total number of people.  In the final three 
weeks, theft is calculated by summing the total quantity in the East and the West in 
each period and dividing by the population of the region in each period.  The West 
is missing an observation for period 29 since subjects could not be in the West 
until period 30. 
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Figure 3. Difference between Potential and Actual Profit in Weeks 1-4 
The dark-shaded (light-shaded) area represents the difference between potential 
and actual profit in pairs (groups of four). 
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Figure 4. Subjects in the West by Treatment 
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Figure 5. Difference between Potential and Actual Profit in the East 
  
34 
 
 
Figure 6. Difference between Potential and Actual Profit in the West 
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